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1Abstract
In the context of the centipede game this paper discusses a solution con-
cept for extensive games that is based on subgame perfection and uncertainty
aversion. Players who deviate from the equilibrium path are considered non-
rational. Rational players who face non-rational opponents face genuine un-
certainty and may have non-additive beliefs about their future play. Rational
players are boundedly uncertainty averse and maximise Choquet expected
utility. It is shown that if the centipede game is suﬃciently long, then the
equilibrium strategy is to play ‘Across’ early in the game and to play ‘Down’
late in the game.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D81.
Key Words: centipede game, uncertainty aversion, backward induction, Choquet
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21 Introduction
The centipede game has become a benchmark both for the empirical adequacy and
the theoretical consistency of game theoretic concepts. In any Nash equilibrium
— and thus in every equilibrium reﬁnement — the ﬁrst player chooses ‘Down’
immediately; in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium the players choose ‘Down’
everywhere.
Empirically, experimental evidence suggests that players do not act in this way
(see, e.g. , McKelvey & Palfrey (1992)). Theoretically, subgame perfection applies
equilibrium arguments, that hold for rational players, oﬀ the equilibrium path.
This is consistent only under the assumption that deviations from rational play are
not evidence of non-rationality, e.g. because rational players might tremble (Selten
1975). This aspect has led to a controversial debate about backward induction (see,
e.g. , Basu (1988), Reny (1993), Aumann (1995), Binmore (1996), Aumann (1996)).
McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) are able to interpret experimental evidence in the sense
of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts & Wilson (1982, henceforth KMRW). In their model,
the structure of the game is not mutual knowledge. Instead there is a small prob-
ability of being matched with an ‘altruistic’ opponent who always plays ‘Across’.
McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) show that, as a consequence, it is indeed rational to
play ‘Across’ early in the game.
There are two arguments against this way of interpreting the experimental evidence.
First, if taken as an explanation of evidence rather than an equilibrium eﬀect, it
relies on the actual existence of such altruists in the subject pool. The second,
formulated by Selten (1991) in the context of the KMRW approach to the ﬁnitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, is that the analysis proceeds by changing the game,
and not by analysing the same game in which the paradox arises. However, both
criticisms do not apply if the players are assumed to know the game, but lack
mutual knowledge of rationality, as suggested by Milgrom & Roberts (1982, p.303).
If the rational players believe that non-rational opponents always play ‘Across’, the
analysis of McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) is an explanation of the actual evidence in
the original game.
Still, this approach to modelling lack of mutual knowledge of rationality leads to
conceptual diﬃculties:
3First, there is no reason why rational players should hold this speciﬁc belief about
opponents that they do not consider to be rational. Therefore, not only is the spec-
iﬁcation of the belief that non-rational players always play ‘Across’ ad hoc, in the
absence of a theory of non-rationality there is no basis for specifying any particular
belief.
Secondly, this also holds in particular for the uniform distribution as a model of
complete ignorance. There is no reason why a non-rational player should be as-
sumed to choose all his strategies with equal probability. In addition, there is the
well-known problem that a uniform probability depends on the description of the
space of uncertainty: For instance, if a state is split into two sub-states, the com-
bined probability of the two sub-states under the uniform distribution is higher than
the probability of the original state.
Thirdly, and more fundamentally, if the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is identiﬁed with
rational play, then any deviation must be considered non-rational. This problem
is related to, but diﬀerent from the ﬁrst: Not only need the players not have a
particular belief about non-rational opponents, according to the rationality concept
they must not have any particular belief. This consistency requirement follows from
an identiﬁcation of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with rational play, because this im-
plicitly deﬁnes all other strategies as non-rational.
Finally, the analysis of games under incomplete information on the basis of the
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium assumes that the types of a player correspond to a con-
sistent hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying uncertainty (Harsanyi 1967–68).
This leads to the usual inﬁnite regress. Thus in this analysis the rational player not
only believes that a ‘non-rational’ opponent always plays ‘Across’, but also believes
that the non-rational opponent believes a rational player to believe this, ... ad in-
ﬁnitum. But this means that a rational player must believe that his non-rational
opponent has an inﬁnite and consistent hierarchy of beliefs. This, of course, is at
odds with the interpretation of this opponent as non-rational. It is for this rea-
son that McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) refer to structural uncertainty and ‘altruistic’
types.
Nevertheless, the KMRW approach has been extremely useful in helping to under-
stand strategic interaction, particularly in industrial organization (Kreps & Wilson
1982, Milgrom & Roberts 1982) and, as in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992), in experi-
mental game theory.
4Our model is in the same spirit as KMRW (1982) and McKelvey & Palfrey (1992).
We postulate that rationality is not mutual knowledge, i.e. an opponent may or may
not be rational. We replace the assumption that players have a speciﬁc belief about
non-rational play with the assumption that players are genuinely uncertain about
the way non-rational opponents play. When facing uncertainty, players maximise
Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989, henceforth CEU). According to CEU,
players act in face of uncertainty as if they maximise subjective expected utility.
However, in contrast to a situation in which players face risk, players’ beliefs do not
have to be additive, i.e. the ‘probabilities’ that the players use to weigh consequences
do not have to add to 1.
Our contribution in this paper is to deﬁne an equilibrium concept that extends sub-
game perfection to a game with genuine uncertainty due to lack of mutual knowledge
of rationality. Thus we do not need to make any assumption about the behavior
of non-rational players, and we can avoid modelling them as types. Instead, we
can make an assumption about the rational players’ attitude towards uncertainty.
We assume that they are uncertainty averse, but only boundedly so. We show
that this results in an equilibrium in the centipede game in which rational play-
ers play ‘Across’ early in the game and ‘Down’ late in the game. Moreover, it is
subgame-perfect in the sense that decisions are optimal at every node in the game.
Our result is due to an interaction between the game-theoretic deﬁnition of strategy
as a contingent plan and the players’ attitude towards uncertainty. In calculating
expected utilities, a player who is uncertainty averse will use ‘probability weights’
that do not add up to 1, and a ‘probability residual’ (the diﬀerence between the
sum of the weights and 1) that he will allocate to the worst outcome. As long as
the degree of uncertainty aversion is bounded, however, every strategy of the non-
rational opponent will enter the calculation with some positive weight, however
small. Since a strategy is a contingent plan, it speciﬁes an action — ‘Across’ or
‘Down’ — after every history of the game, even those that are excluded by the
strategy itself (because it speciﬁes ‘Down’ very early). Consequently, the number of
strategies increases exponentially in the length of the centipede game. This means
that early in the game the ‘probability residual’ that is allocated to the worst
outcome is small. Thus even uncertainty-averse players will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to go
‘Across’. Late in the game, however, the number of remaining strategies is small,
5and uncertainty averse players will prefer ‘Down’. We show that this phenomenon
is an equilibrium, i.e. it is stable even if other rational players act in a similar way.
CEU has been introduced into game theory by Dow & Werlang (1994) and Klibanoﬀ
(1993). Dow & Werlang (1994) show that in the presence of uncertainty the back-
ward induction outcome may break down if the ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
is analysed as a normal form game. Our model extends this result in two directions:
First, we give an explicit reason for non-additive uncertainty, the lack of mutual
knowledge of rationality. Secondly, we formulate a solution concept in the spirit of
subgame perfection and show that the backward induction outcome breaks down
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the centipede game, analysed in its extensive
form. This allows the conclusion that these two concepts — backward induction
and subgame perfection — diﬀer fundamentally in the presence of uncertainty.
Other papers that combine the analysis of extensive form games with CEU are
Eichberger & Kelsey (1995) and Lo (1995). In these papers there is no explicit
distinction between rational and non-rational players. Eichberger & Kelsey (1995)
use the Dempster-Shafer rule to update non-additive beliefs. Closest to the spirit
of our analysis is Mukerji (1994), however he considers normal form games only.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the model, section 3 an ex-
ample, section 4 the result, and section 5 concludes. There is one appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Centipede Game
Consider the following version of the centipede game:
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6The decision nodes are numbered from 1 to n. For deﬁniteness we assume that n
is odd. Player P1 moves at odd nodes, player P2 at even nodes. At node i, a player
chooses between ‘Across’ Ai and ‘Down’ Di. The leader payoﬀ is ai, i.e. ai is the
payoﬀ to the player who plays Di. The follower payoﬀ is bi.
The payoﬀs are such that the game is a centipede game, i.e.
(1) ai and bi are strictly increasing in i,
(2) ai > bi+1,
(3) i :=
aibi+1
ai+2bi+1 is weakly increasing in i,
(4) i  1
8 for all i 2 N.
Thus the game corresponds to a situation in which two players can share a certain
proﬁt, but only in unequal terms. Overall proﬁt ai + bi is increasing, but every
player prefers to be the leader now than to be the follower in the next stage. If the
opponent could be relied upon to play ‘Across’, however, each player would play
‘Across’ earlier1. The centipede game is due to Rosenthal (1981), its name is due
to Binmore (1987–88).
A pure strategy of player j is a mapping that associates with each of his decision
nodes i an action Ai or Di. Thus, if a player has m decision nodes he has 2m many
pure strategies, i.e. the number of strategies grows exponentially in the length of
the game.
The players are assumed to have a prior probability that speciﬁes the probability
that the opponent is non-rational. For simplicity we assume that this prior is
common to both players2. We denote this prior probability by , and assume 0 <
 < 1.
Our equilibrium concept aims to capture the optimal strategies of rational players.
Thus a rational player must not have an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium
strategy, as long as a rational opponent does not deviate either. However, a ra-
1Conditions (3) and (4) are conditions on the payoﬀ increases. It means that the sure gains from
playing ‘Down’ in relation to the possible gains from playing ‘Across’ increase, i.e. that playing
‘Down’ does not become less attractive in relative terms (3). Condition (4) says that these gains
must not be too high; this is suﬃcient, but not necessary, to ensure that playing across does not
result from uncertainty love alone. In their experiments, McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) assume that
i is constant with i = 1
7 and n = 4, resp. n = 6. (See also footnote 9.)
2Allowing diﬀerent priors only introduces one more degree of freedom. This would not make
the analysis conceptually deeper, and would make it easier to generate diﬀerent equilibria.
7tional player does not know what a non-rational opponent will do, and so faces
genuine uncertainty. We assume that, when facing this uncertainty, rational players
maximise Choquet expected utility in the sense of Schmeidler (1989).
2.2 Choquet Expected Utility Theory
According to CEU, players act in the face of uncertainty as if they possess a utility
function over consequences and subjective beliefs over the domain of uncertainty,
and maximise subjective expected utility. However, in contrast to a situation in
which players face risk, players’ beliefs do not have to be additive, i.e. representable
by a probability measure. Instead, players’ beliefs are represented by a capacity,
i.e. a not necessarily additive ‘probability’ measure.
This model thus corresponds to a situation in which uncertainty cannot be reduced
to probability. This model allows a parsimonious explanation of the Ellsberg para-
dox that people do not act as if their beliefs can be represented by probability
measures. CEU retains the useful notion of belief and explains lack of probabilistic
sophistication as a result of the players’ attitude towards uncertainty.
Formally, let S be a set of states of nature. Let s 2 S and let Σ  2S be a
-algebra of events E 2 Σ. A capacity associates with each event a real number
such that3
(1) v(;) = 0,
(2) v(S) = 1, and
(3) E  E0 =) v(E)  v(E0).
The expected utility with respect to a capacity is deﬁned as the Choquet (1953)
integral: Let X be a simple positive random variable, i.e. X takes the positive
values x1;x2;:::;xk on the events E1;E2;:::;En. The sets are measurable, pairwise
disjoint, and their union is S. Without loss of generality, assume x1 > x2 > ::: > xk
and set xk+1 := 0. As usual, let v(X  t) := v(f! 2 ΩjX(!)  tg).






3The monotonicity property (iii) weakens the ﬁnite-additivity axiom E \ E0 = ; =) v(E [
E0) = v(E) + v(E0) for ﬁnitely-additive measures.






If v is additive this is the usual expectation. Thus the Choquet integral generalizes
the usual formula for the expectation in terms of the decumulative distribution
function E X =
R 1
0 F(X  t)dt. It is a natural deﬁnition for an integral because
it assigns to a characteristic function 1E of an event E the capacity v(E) of this






The non-additivity of v allows the formalisation of the player’s attitude towards
uncertainty. According to the deﬁnition of the integral, if probability weights are not
additive then the probability residual is allocated to the worse outcome: Consider
two events E and E0 Let E \ E0 = ; and E [ E0 = S. Assume that the random
variable X takes value x1 on E and x2 on E0, and that x1 > x2. Let v(E)+v(E0) <
1. Then by the deﬁnition of the integral
R
S Xdv = x1  v(E) + x2  (1  v(E)).
This means that the probability residual 1 v(E)v(E0) is allocated to the worse
outcome. Thus subadditivity of a players’ beliefs corresponds to his uncertainty
aversion when facing genuine uncertainty. A decision-theoretic axiomatisation of
uncertainty aversion in terms of preferences over acts is due to Schmeidler (1989)5.
When a player faces a non-rational opponent his relevant space of uncertainty is the
opponent’s pure strategy set.Therefore, we assume that a rational player assigns to
each of his opponent’s pure strategies sj 2 Sj some ”probability weight” sj  0.
Since any deviation from rationality is as non-rational as another, the player has
no reason to regard any of a non-rational opponent’s strategies more likely than
another. For this reason we assume sj = , for all sj 2 Sj. This also simpliﬁes the
analysis. For simplicity we also assume that the players are identical, i.e. that the
 is the same for both of them6.
5For related axiomatisations see, e.g. Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) and Sarin & Wakker (1994)
6As before, introducing a diﬀerent degree of uncertainty aversion for the second player corre-
sponds to an additional degree of freedom. We think it is desirable not to introduce any ad hoc
asymmetry.
9If a rational player is completely uncertainty averse, we have  = 0, and in evaluating
one of his pure strategies the player will assign probability 1 to the opponent’s
strategy that minimizes his utility. As long as  > 0, the player is only boundedly
uncertainty averse, in that he gives some weight, however small, to other strategies
of his opponent. Formally, this means that a rational player’s beliefs about the





1 , E = Sj
jEj , E  Sj:
The assumption that the rational player is uncertainty averse thus translates into
 < 1
jSjj. The main point of this paper is that there is an interaction between
uncertainty aversion and the game-theoretic deﬁnition of strategy, as long as the
uncertainty aversion is bounded.
2.4 Expected Payoﬀs
The speciﬁcation of this capacity now allows us to deﬁne the payoﬀ, that a rational
opponent expects if he plays his pure strategy si 2 Si and believes that his opponent





Since a player does not know, however, if his opponent is rational or not, but has a
prior belief  that the opponent is non-rational, his expected payoﬀ from his strategy
si given that a rational opponent uses strategy s
j is given by
(1  )u(si;s
j) + u(si;v):
A rational player will choose a strategy that maximises his payoﬀ not only at the
beginning of the game, but also in each subgame. It thus remains to specify how a
rational player’s beliefs change during the course of the game.
2.5 Updating and the Dempster-Shafer Rule
An updating rule has to generalize Bayes’ Rule to non-additive probability measures.
We assume that non-additive beliefs are updated through the Dempster-Shafer rule.
7Here jEj denotes the cardinality of the set E.
10Formally, let v be a capacity and consider the events E;F 2 Σ. The Dempster-
Shafer rule speciﬁes that the posterior capacity of event E is given by
v(EjF) :=
v(E [ F)  v(F)
1  v(F)
:
The Dempster-Shafer rule (Dempster 1968, Shafer 1976) corresponds to Bayes’ Rule
if the capacity is additive. When it is not, it reﬂects the uncertainty aversion, or
pessimism, of the player (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1993).
The main use we make of the Dempster-Shafer rule is that it allows the formalization
of the updating process after an action that is only taken by a non-rational player:
Let  be the prior probability that the opponent is not rational. Assume that the
opponent has two actions A and D, and that a rational opponent chooses action A
with probability p. Then the posterior belief 0 about the opponents’ rationality is
given by
0 :=
  (1  jSjj)
1  jSjj  (1  )(1  p)
;
where jSjj is the number of the opponents’ strategies, in the subgame starting at
the given node, that specify D. This is formally derived in the appendix.
Note that, ﬁrst, if p = 0 and only a non-rational player chooses A the Dempster-
Shafer rule gives the result that 0 = 1. Secondly, if p = 1 then 0 < , i.e. a rational
action is interpreted as evidence of rationality. Finally, as long as there is some
doubt about the rationality of the opponent at the beginning of the game, there are
no probability zero events.
We can now deﬁne the solution concept.
2.6 The Equilibrium Concept
An equilibrium is a strategy combination from which no rational player has an
incentive to deviate unilaterally. We are considering an extensive game in which
rationality is not mutual knowledge, so we have to extend this deﬁnition in two
ways: First, we incorporate the assumption that rational players face genuine un-
certainty, maximise Choquet expected utility, are boundedly uncertainty averse and
update their beliefs according to the Dempster-Shafer rule. Secondly, in the spirit
of subgame perfection we require optimality at each decision node.




(1) at each node, each pure strategy of a rational player in their support max-
imises his expected utility given his beliefs about the opponent’s rationality,
the rational opponent’s strategy, and the degree of uncertainty aversion,
(2) the beliefs about rational opponents are correct, and
(3) the beliefs about the opponent’s rationality are updated according to the
Dempster-Shafer rule.
We now have the following results:
Result 1:
Every centipede game has at least on -perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium, for every
common degree of uncertainty aversion  and every degree  of mutual knowledge
of rationality.
Result 2:
However small the degree  of lack of mutual knowledge of rationality, and however
small the degree of uncertainty aversion, as long as they are positive, in the -perfect
Choquet-Nash equilibrium the ﬁrst player will not play ‘Down’ with probability 1.
The results are formally stated and in section 4. In the next section we illustrate
them by an example.
3 An Example
Consider the following centipede game:
r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7










































12We assume that players have a common prior  = 1
3 that the opponent is non-
rational. We assume that players are boundedly uncertainty averse with degree of
uncertainty aversion  = 1
20 for both players.
By backward induction, we analyse this game starting from node 7.
At node 7, player P1 will achieve 2000 if he plays D7 as opposed to 1600 if he plays
A7. He is no longer in a situation of strategic interaction but in a pure decision
situation. Therefore D7 is his optimal choice.
At node 6, player P2 faces both risk and uncertainty. He faces the risk that the
opponent is non-rational, which is given by player P2’s belief 6 at node 6. Moreover,
he faces the uncertainty what a non-rational opponent might play. The opponent
has two strategies at node 7. Since P2 is uncertainty averse, each of these strategies
receives probability weight . The residual 1  2 is allocated to the strategy that
is worst for P2. Thus his Choquet expected utility from a non-rational opponent is
given by
u2(v6;A6) = (1  2)800 + 800 + 4000
= 800 + (4000  800)
= 960:
In calculating his overall payoﬀ from A6, P2 knows, by backward induction, that a
rational player P1 will play D7, which results for P2 in a payoﬀ of 800. Thus his
overall payoﬀ is given by
(1  6)800 + 6960:
P2 can ensure 1000 by playing D6, so D6 is optimal.
At node 5, it follows by the same reasoning that D5 is optimal.
At node 4, player P2 knows that a non-rational opponent has four strategies in the
continuation game, and that it is optimal to play D6 at node 6. Thus P2’s Choquet
expected utility from a non-rational opponent is given by
u2(v4;A4) = (1  4)200 + 2200 + 21000
= 200 + 2(1000  200)
= 280:
13Thus his overall payoﬀ is given by
(1  4)200 + 4280: (1)
P2 can only ensure 250 by playing D4, so the optimal strategy depends on his beliefs
4.
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, 4 and 2 are related as follows:
4 :=
2  (1  8
20)
1  8
202  (1  2)(1  p
3)
: (2)
At node 3, player P1 knows that a non-rational opponent has four strategies in the
continuation game, and that it is optimal to play D5 at node 5. Thus P1’s Choquet
expected utility from a non-rational opponent is given by
u1(A3;v3) = (1  4)100 + 2100 + 2500
= 100 + 2(500  100)
= 140:
Thus his overall payoﬀ is given by
(1  3)[p
4500 + (1  p
4)100] + 3140; (3)
where p
4 is the probability with which a rational player P2 plays A4. P1 can only
ensure 125 by playing D3, so the optimal strategy depends on his beliefs 3 and on
P2’s optimal strategy p
4.
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, 3 and  are related as follows:
3 :=
  (1  8
20)
1  8
20  (1  )(1  p
2)
: (4)
At node 2, player P2 knows that a non-rational opponent has eight strategies in
the continuation game, and that it is optimal to play A4 with probability p
4 at node
4. However, he also knows that at node 4 he can ensure 250, so that p
4, due to its
optimality, ensures at least as much. Thus P2’s Choquet expected utility from a
non-rational opponent is bounded below:
u2(v2;A2)  (1  8)50 + 450 + 4250
= 50 + 4(250  50)
= 90:
14Thus his overall payoﬀ is bounded below by
(1  2)[p
3250 + (1  p
3)50] + 290; (5)
where p
3 is the probability with which a rational player P1 plays A3. This payoﬀ is
bounded below by 50 + 402 for p
3 = 0.
By the Dempster-Shafer rule, 2 and  are related as follows:
2 :=
  (1  16
20)
1  16
20  (1  )(1  p
1)
: (6)
At node 1, player P1 knows that a non-rational opponent has eight strategies in
the continuation game, and that it is optimal to play A3 with probability p
3 at node
3, which gives at least 125. Thus P1’s Choquet expected utility from a non-rational
opponent is bounded below:
u1(A1;v1)  (1  8)25 + 425 + 4125 (7)
= 25 + 4(125  25) (8)
= 45: (9)
Thus his overall payoﬀ is bounded below by
(1  1)[p
2125 + (1  p
2)25] + 145;
where p
2 is the probability with which a rational player P2 plays A2.
Since 1 :=  = 1
3, it follows that
(1  1)[p
2125 + (1  p








Since D1 gives 30, P1 will prefer A1.
From the Dempster-Shafer rule, this implies
2 :=
  (1  16
20)
1  16







This, in turn, implies that at node 2 the continuation payoﬀ is bounded below by
50 + 402 = 590
11 < 60. This shows that despite the boundedness of uncertainty
aversion the increasing payoﬀs alone do not lead player P2 to choose ‘Across’ at
15node 2. If he does so, then because he expects a rational opponent also to be
willing to go ‘Across’. In equilibrium, these beliefs are self-fulﬁlling.


































From (4) with p









4 and 3, player P1 is indiﬀerent between A3 and D3 at node 3,
and so is willing to mix. From (3) his continuation payoﬀ is given by
(1  3)[p





[(1000 + 205 + 420]
= 125:
From (2), with p
3 = 36














16Finally, given 4 = 5
8, player P2 is indiﬀerent between A4 and D4, because his
continuation payoﬀ is, from (1),





To summarize, the equilibrium is given by:
r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r


















































We end this section with some remarks:
(1) In this example, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. This can be seen from
equations (1) and (2): If p
3 = 0 then 4 = 1, thus A4 is optimal, which leads to
p
3 = 1, a contradiction. Conversely, if p
3 = 1 then (5) implies p
2 = 1. But then
3 = 3
13 and the continuation payoﬀ (3) at node 3 is (13)100+3140 < 125,
which leads to p
3 = 0, another contradiction. In general, however, a pure
strategy equilibrium may exist.
(2) In our example,  = 1
3 is larger than in Kreps et al. (1982) and McKelvey &
Palfrey (1992). It can be shown, however, that for no  > 0 will D1 be chosen
with probability one. More generally, here  refers to a player’s belief that the
opponent is rational, and reasons in the same way as the player himself. This
makes a high  a plausible parameter value.
(3) Players adjust the belief  about the opponent’s rationality both upward and
downward, and not just in one direction. An action that is taken by a rational
player with high probability is taken as evidence of rationality and  is adjusted
downward. Conversely, an action that a rational player only chooses with
low probability is considered as evidence of non-rationality and  is adjusted
upward.
17(4) It is interesting to note that the taking probability does not increase monoton-
ically. Also, in contrast to the sequential equilibrium in McKelvey & Palfrey
(1992) the taking probability may be 1 not only at the last two nodes of the
game.
(5) The analysis does not give a bell-shaped distribution over the terminal nodes.
In McKelvey & Palfrey (1992), the sequential equilibrium alone does not either,
however, they are able to show that the incorporation of learning can explain
the empirical data.
4 Results
We now state and prove the results formally.
Deﬁnition.
A centipede game Γ = (n;(fDi;Aig)i=1;:::;n;(ai;bi)i=1;:::;n+1) is given by a set N of
n nodes i 2 N, for each node two actions Di and Ai, and for each action Di and
for An two payoﬀs ai and bi such that
(1) ai and bi are strictly increasing in i,
(2) ai > bi+1,
(3) i :=
aibi+1
ai+2bi+1 is weakly increasing in i,
(4) i  1
8 for all i 2 N.
For pure strategies s1 and s2 let uj(s1;s2) be ak or bk, where k := minfk0jsj(k0) =
Dk0 for some player j g, depending on whether k 2 Nj or not. Let j be a behavior
strategy of player j, where j(i) speciﬁes the probability of ‘Across’ at node i under
j. Let uj(1;2) be the expected utility8 of player j under the behavior strategies
1, 2.
Let  be the common degree of uncertainty aversion of the two players, where9




. For given n,  is the upper bound on  to ensure uncertainty
aversion.
8Behavior strategies deﬁne additive probabilities over the pure strategy sets, so this is the usual
expectation.
9The upper bound on  preserves uncertainty aversion. If it is violated, both propositions still
hold, but proposition 2 is due to uncertainty love alone.




is equivalent10 to n  n := [(2 (ld ) + 1)], where ld denotes
the logarithm to the base 2. For given , n is the upper bound on n that ensures
that players are uncertainty averse even at the beginning of the game.
Deﬁnition.
Let Γ be a centipede game. Let N1 and N2 be the set of player 1’s and 2’s decision
nodes i. Let  be the degree of the players’ attitude towards uncertainty aversion,
and let  be the common prior about rationality. let 0 = 1 :=  Then a -perfect
Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a pair of behavior strategies (
1;
2) such that if s
1
and s




1 2 argmaxs1(1  i)u1(s1;
2) + iu1(s1;vi); 8i 2 N1,
s
2 2 argmaxs2(1  i)u2(















1 , E = Sj;i
jEj , E  Sj;i;
where Sj;i is the strategy set of the opponent in the subgame beginning at node i.
Proposition 1.
For all  and all , there exists a -perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
Proof.11
Let u1(s1;vi) and u2(vi;s2) be deﬁned as in (3) and (4), and let u1(1;vi) and
u2(vi;2) be the (additive) expectations of u1(s1;vi) and u2(vi;s2) under the be-
havior strategies 1 and 2. Consider the correspondence12 ' : [0;1]n[0;1]n1 !






p (1  )u1(p;2) + iu1(p;vi) 8i 2 N1; (5)
10Following Kolmogorov & Fomin (1954), we denote for a 2 R the integral part by [a] (the
largest integer smaller than a), and the fractional part by < a > (< a >= a  [a]).
11The only diﬀerence to the standard existence proof is that we apply ﬁxed point arguments
directly to the extensive form. The reason for this is that there is no agent normal form, since
non-rational players cannot be modelled as players, who would choose additive behavior strategies.
On the other hand, applying non-additive equilibrium concepts to the normal form game between
rational agents only would require a model of independent choices by more than two players with
heterogeneous priors about the rationality of the opponents.
12Note that equation (7) is well-deﬁned for i = 0. Given our assumption that  > 0, i will not




(1  )u2(1;p) + iu2(vi;p) 8i 2 N2; (6)
0
i+2 :=
i  (1  jSj;i+1j)
1  ijSj;i+1j  (1  i)(1  j(i + 1))
: (7)
We ﬁrst show that a ﬁxed point of this correspondence is a -perfect Choquet-Nash
equilibrium:
Let (ˆ 1(i); ˆ 2(i);ˆ i) 2 '(ˆ 1(i); ˆ 2(i);ˆ i). This means
ˆ 1(i) 2 argmax
p
(1  ˆ )u1(p; ˆ 2) + ˆ iu1(p;vi) 8i 2 N1; (8)
ˆ 2(i) 2 argmax
p
(1  ˆ )u2(ˆ 1;p) + ˆ iu2(vi;p) (9)
ˆ i+2 :=
ˆ i  (1  jSj;i+1j)
1  ˆ ijSj;i+1j  (1  ˆ i)(1  ˆ j(i + 1))
: (10)
By their deﬁnitions, u1(p;2), u2(1;p), u1(p;vi) and u2(vi;p) are linear in p, so
if ˆ 1(i) and ˆ 2(i) are maximisers then so are the pure strategies ˆ s1(i) and ˆ s2(i)
in their support13. Consequently (ˆ 1(i); ˆ 2(i);ˆ i) satisfy (1) — (4) for any given
  0  1.
It remains to be shown that such a ﬁxed point exists. Since ' maps a closed,
bounded and convex subset of a ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space into itself, Kaku-
tani’s Theorem (1941) implies that a ﬁxed point exists if ' is non-empty, convex-
valued and has a closed graph. Since the maximands are linear in p, they are
continuous over a compact domain and, by Weierstraß’ Theorem, the maxima in
(5) and (6) exist. Moreover, (7) uniquely determines 0
i+2. So ' is non-empty. Also,
from the linearity of (5) and (6) and the uniqueness of (7), ' is convex-valued.
Finally, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem (1959), ' is closed-valued and upper hemi-
continuous. This implies that ' has a closed graph (Border 1985, p.56, Theorem
11.9 (a)). This completes the proof.
Note that the equilibrium is not unique. Intuitively, a rational player will go across if
his expected utility from a non-rational opponent — determined by his uncertainty
aversion — and the expected utility from a rational opponent — weighted by his
belief about the likelihood of non-rationality — is higher or equal than his payoﬀ
from going down. His belief at this node is his update given his initial beliefs and
the rational strategies. It may be that the initial belief is exactly such to make him
indiﬀerent. Generically, however, this will not be the case.
13Note that for u1(p;vi) and u2(vi;p) this is due to the order of integration.
20We refer to player Pi as the player who moves at node i, and denote by Si the set of
pure strategies of player Pi in the subgame starting at node i. We denote by (i)
the equilibrium probability with which player Pi plays Ai at node i.
Proposition 2.
8 > 0 8 > 0 9N 8n : If N  n  n then (1) 6= 0.
Proof. Indirect. Suppose (1) = 0. Then 2 = 1 and P2 will choose A2 if
a2  (1  2) [(3)a4 + (1  (3))b3]












Now deﬁne N as the smallest integer bigger than 4 + 2(ld 2)  2(ld ). Note that
4 + 2(ld 2)  2(ld )  2(ld )  2




so that N  n. Finally consider n with N  n  n: Note that













But jS3j  2
n2









we have independently of 




This would imply (1) 6= 0, a contradiction. So indeed (1) > 0. This completes
the proof.
215 Conclusion
A -perfect Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a solution concept for the centipede game
that combines subgame-perfection with uncertainty aversion. We suggest as a rea-
son why players choose ‘Across’ early in the game the boundedness of uncertainty
aversion. Even though players are uncertainty averse, if there is enough uncertainty
from which players can proﬁt and if they expect their rational opponents also to
play ‘Across’ then it is indeed rational to play ‘Across’.
On a conceptual level, the equilibrium concept allows the analysis of the centipede
game without the assumption that rationality is mutual knowledge. It avoids sev-
eral diﬃculties that arise in the Kreps et al. (1982) approach: First, non-rational
players are not necessarily ‘altruistic’ and always play ‘Across’. Secondly, we do not
need to specify any particular belief about non-rational opponents, which in the
absence of a theory of non-rational play would necessarily be ad hoc. In particular,
we can avoid the diﬃculties associated with the uniform distribution as a model
of ignorance. Thirdly, we do not need to refer to non-rational players as types,
which would ascribe to them a consistent hierarchy of beliefs. Finally, the solution
concept is consistent with the interpretation of equilibrium strategies as rational
strategies, which implicitly deﬁnes all other strategies as non-rational. As a result,
the structure of the game may be assumed to be mutual knowledge.
At the same time, our solution concept builds on existing game-theoretic concepts.
First, the analysis is in the same spirit as Kreps et al. (1982), which has proved to
be so useful in industrial organization. Secondly, the solution concept is an equi-
librium concept, and avoids the indeterminateness associated with weaker solution
concepts. Similarly, the solution concept is static, and does not rest on the speciﬁ-
cation of a dynamic learning or evolutionary process. Finally, we preserve the spirit
of subgame perfection in requiring optimality at all decision nodes. Thus we extend
the approach of Dow & Werlang (1994) to extensive games.
The limitations of our approach are the following: First, the actual computation of
an equilibrium may be complicated, it corresponds to the computation of a ﬁxed
point, as does the sequential equilibrium in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992). Secondly,
the degree of uncertainty aversion is not directly observable. How to elicit this
degree from a purely decision-theoretic environment is an issue for future research.
22That the degree of uncertainty aversion is bounded, however, seems a plausible
hypothesis whose usefulness can only be established empirically. Finally, while our
solution concept gives an ‘inner’ equilibrium for the centipede game, it does not
replicate the distribution of actual choices. While the sequential equilibrium with
‘altruistic’ types in McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) alone does not give this distribution
either, McKelvey & Palfrey (1992) show that additional hypotheses, both about
how players make mistakes and how they learn during the game, do. To introduce
such hypotheses in a consistent way is another topic for future research.
Appendix
Let v be a capacity and consider the events E;F 2 Σ. The Dempster-Shafer rule
speciﬁes that the posterior capacity of event E is given by
v(EjF) :=
v(E [ F)  v(F)
1  v(F)
:
Let  be the prior probability that the opponent is not rational. Assume that the
opponent has two actions A and D at the given node n. Assume that a rational
opponent chooses action A with probability p. Finally, assume S is the set of the
opponent’s pure strategies that specify the action D at the given node.
Then the posterior belief 0 about the opponent’s rationality after action A is given
by
0 :=
  (1  jSj)
1  (1  )(1  p)  jSj
;
where jSj is the number of the opponents’ strategies S, and  the prior belief about
the opponent’s rationality, with 0 <  < 1.
This is derived as follows:
Let R be the event that the opponent is rational, let R be the event that he is
non-rational.
We want to calculate
0  v(RjA) :=






















(7) v(R) = 1  ,
(8) v(R) = ,
(9) v(DjR) = 1  p, and
(10) v(DjR) = jSj,
so that
(11) v(D [ R) = (1  )(1  p) + , and
(12) v(D [ R) = jSj + (1  ).
Thus
v(D) = (1  )(1  p) + jSj:
Consequently,
0 :=
  (1  jSj)
1  (1  )(1  p)  jSj
: (13)
Note:
 The derivation is only valid under lack of mutual knowledge of rationality, i.e.
for  > 0 and  < 1, otherwise v(DjR) or v(DjR) are not well-deﬁned.
 With 0 <  < 1 there are no probability zero events. Since jSj strategies specify
action D and there are two actions at this node, the number of strategies is 2jSj.
So uncertainty aversion means  < 1
2jSj. It follows that




This holds for any p 2 [0;1], including the boundaries.
 In particular, if  > 0 then 0 > 0, independently of p. However, if p = 0, then
0 = 1. Thus we also need to be able to update the belief  = 1. Intuitively, if
24the prior belief about the opponent is that he is non-rational and beliefs about
his behavior are boundedly uncertainty averse, then there are no probability
zero events, and the posterior belief should also be that the opponent is non-
rational.This can be justiﬁed directly from the Dempster-Shafer rule (1): From
monotonicity, v(R)  v(R [ D), therefore v(R [ D) = 1. Also, (6) implies
v(DjR) = v(D [ R), so again by monotonicity, v(D)  v(D [ R) = jSj < 1.
Since this result also follows if we substitute  = 1 into (13), we do not have to
explicitly track this special case.
 The reason why  = 0 has to be excluded is that there is no parallel argument
that  = 0 and p = 0 should give 0 = 1. (3) implies v(D [ R) = v(DjR) = 1 and
(1) gives 0 =
1v(D)
1v(D), but v(D) 6< 1.
 Whether action A is interpreted as evidence of rationality or evidence of non-





() (1  )(1  p)  (1  )jSj
() p  1  jSj:
Other things equal, the higher the probability of A, the more likely it is that A
is evidence of rationality, because A is taken with high probability by rational
players. The lower  and jSj, the less likely it is that A is interpreted as evidence
of rationality, because the greater is the uncertainty that A is taken by a non-
rational player.
 Finally, note that the argument rests heavily on (2), i.e. the the requirement
about beliefs that an opponent is either rational or non-rational, so that these
beliefs have to be additive.
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